Israel

The division of the former British mandate of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel in the years after the end of World War II has been at the heart of Middle Eastern conflicts for the past half century (BBC 2006y, par. 1). Israel has participated once with a voluntary contribution of $26,500 to UNFICYP (UNDPI 1996, 708). The Israeli-Arab conflict and its support from the USA would make the participation of Israeli troops highly politicized. One reason is the risk that Israel’s troops would face if sent to areas where anti-Israeli sentiment could jeopardize their security. It is also potentially true that the political internal environment considers that the troops are needed to protect Israeli territory against any foreign aggression. Thus, it is not reliable to send troops. Nevertheless, Israeli has offered technical assistance to DPKO.

First, this section focuses on the UN peace operations deployed into Israeli territory. UNTSO was established in May 1948 to assist the United Nations Mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine (UN 2006d, par. 1).

The United Nations Emergency Force I, 1956-1967, (UNEF I) was established to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces (UN 2003a, par. 1).

UNEF II was established in October 1973 (ended in 1979) to supervise the ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces and, following the conclusion of the agreements of January 1974 and September 1975, to supervise the redeployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces and to man and control the buffer zones established under those agreements (UN 2003b, par. 1).

Initial variables of the data collection process:

UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
During the 60th Session of the General Assembly, Israel stated that it supports the creation of a Peace Building Commission and is committed to participate in this debate in the coming months (Adam 2005, par. 2).

Although in recent years, some UN organs, programs, and agencies as well as the World Bank have been involved in conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy –this issue remains the biggest challenge of the international community in general and the UN in particular. Israel is of the view that conflict prevention is not dealt with in a sufficient manner in the initial mandate of the Peace Building Commission as described in the Outcome Document. We believe it is clear to Member States that the issue of conflict prevention should be a major element in the commission’s term of reference. My delegation would like to hear the panel’s view on that issue. How does it plan to cover this challenge and what means are considered fit to execute this task? (Ibid., par. 3)

The Israeli delegation stated that the second issue is the sustainability of the work of the commission, which depends on national sovereignty. Israel believes that the work of the commission along with its support unit in the secretariat should be sustainable when dealing with a specific case (Ibid., par. 4).

We believe, what researchers and experts have recently understood, that only by involving governments, by strengthening them, and making their actions more accountable and transparent, would the Peace Building Commission and its secretariat succeed in fulfilling its task in the long term. That is in addition of course to the involvement of the civil sector, private sector, the development community and the DPKO. (Ibid.)

It is common knowledge among the post-conflict and reconstruction community that it is imperative to involve governments and the public sector, while engaging in an effort to assist in a post-conflict crisis (Ibid., par. 5). Israel believes that the commission should emphasize the interaction with the governments concerned, “we [Israel] would like to hear the panel’s view on how it intends to deal with this issue” (Ibid.). Israel fully supports the open and constructive preparatory process we are undergoing and looks forward to the establishment of a vital and effective commission (Ibid.).

Perception of peacekeeping
During the 61st Session of the General Assembly, Ran Gidor (2006) from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem stated that “this year Israeli officers participated for the first time in peacekeeping courses organized by DPKO” (2006, par. 1). For Israel “this has been another major step in the process of integrating ourselves into the full canopy of UN sponsored operations around the globe” (Ibid.).

Israel is interested in contributing some of its hard-won military experience and technical proficiency, in order to assist peace-keeping activities around the world. Accordingly, we intend to send more representatives to DPKO's courses and seminars in the very near future. Additionally, we hope to expand our contribution to DPKO's operations. That could be in the form of military observers, police training or through putting hi-tech units such as in forensic science, in which – due to our unfortunate geo-political circumstances, we have accumulated unparalleled expertise – at the disposal of the DPKO. It is our hope, that the lessons we have learnt as a result of war and in our fight against terrorism, will be utilized in order to promote and sustain peace. (Ibid., par. 2)

Israel is currently engaged in a process of analyzing the experience of the first few Israeli graduates of peacekeeping courses (Ibid., par. 3). “We are looking forward to consolidating our cooperation with DPKO in the very near future” (Ibid.).

Another issue that is important to consider is the perception of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). Thinking about what Israeli thinks about peacekeeping operations is not only the main issue here, but also what the world thinks about Israeli soldiers participating in UN peace operations.

Domestic political environment
Although the full impact of the July-August 2006 war with Hizbullah in Lebanon will take some time to emerge, the initial widespread popular support that the war garnered in Israel was quickly overtaken by increasing criticism of the way it was conducted by the prime minister, Ehud Olmert, with accusations of hesitancy and inconsistency (EIU 2006bs, 1).

Political turmoil will continue to characterize the domestic political scene in Israel, and public discontent with the country’s leaders is rising, fuelled by alleged corruption scandals involving senior public officials. The fallout from of the war is also likely to result in some form of coalition "restructuring" or even in early elections. The forthcoming debate on the 2007 budget will pose some difficulties for the current Kadima-led ruling coalition government, and the Labor Party might face internal difficulties and even a challenge to its current leader (and defence minister), Amir Peretz. The impact of the war on the economy, though still not fully apparent, will be to depress real GDP growth in 2006-07 and raise fiscal expenditure from previous estimates. In 2008, however, economic growth should rebound and the budget deficit should narrow. (Ibid.)

Domestic economic environment
The current government will attempt to continue with the previous administration’s broad policies of liberalizing the economy, setting realistic fiscal and other targets, and proceeding with privatization and structural reforms (Ibid., 9). However, “the conflict in Lebanon will raise fiscal expenditure and is likely to lead to the government missing its previously set fiscal targets for 2006-07, but the deficit is still expected to remain within the broader 3% of GDP target” (Ibid.).

Military affairs
To counter the threat that it believes it faces from its neighbors, Israel has built up a strong military capability, based on conscription and a system of annual reserve duty (EIU 2006v, 16). This concern has driven the Israeli efforts to arm themselves against any regional threat. Of the IDF’s estimated serving strength of 168,000 in 2004, 107,500 were conscripts (Ibid.).

Israel’s military strategies are not only limited to recruitment. Israel is believed to have had a nuclear capability for several decades, with up to 200 warheads, but the government and military have refused to either confirm or deny whether they possess a nuclear-weapons capability. Israeli defence doctrine demands that the regular army be capable of absorbing a first strike by Arab forces to give time to mobilize reserves and push fighting into enemy territory. (Ibid.)

Israeli military members have raised moral concerns within its troops. Some of the Israeli army’s tactics during the unrest led some IDF reserve officers to refuse to serve in the Palestinian Territories, sparking public debate, but it did not lead to widespread refusal to serve (Ibid., 17).

Foreign policy
The dominant factors shaping Israel’s foreign and defence policies have been the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israel’s alliance with the US (Ibid., 15). Successive Israeli governments have made the link with the US a cornerstone of their policies (Ibid.). If the USA is not providing troops to UN peace operations, most likely Israel will use similar arguments. The USA support for Israel is absolutely necessary for Israel. For this reason, “the US is Israel’s favored broker of any Middle East settlement” (Ibid.). Israel is wary of any diplomatic role for the EU, and even more so for the UN, as their policies are perceived by Israelis to be more sympathetic to the Palestinian plight (Ibid.).

Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:

Climate changes
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.

Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.